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Abstract 
This paper compares the patterns of income transfers within village communities in the north and 
south of Vietnam by analyzing household survey and experimental data. The results of 
household data analysis show private transfers flow from high-income households to low-income 
households in the south where social safety net is limited. In contrast, private transfers do not 
correlate with pre-transfer income in the north where public transfers are more widespread. In 
addition, public transfers crowd out private transfers in the north. We conducted a trust game in 
both regions and found consistent results. People in the south are more altruistic toward the poor: 
they send more to the poor without expecting higher repayment. This pattern is consistent with 
the idea that private norms of redistribution from rich to poor are active in the south, but are 
crowded out in the north, possibly by communist public institutions, although we observe higher 
levels of trust and reciprocity in the north. 
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This paper compares patterns of income transfers between rich and poor population 
segments of village communities in the north and south of Vietnam by analyzing survey and 
experimental data.  
Transfers are important because people living in low-income countries often get caught in 
a poverty trap, spending all they earn, saving little, if any, living from hand to mouth and barely 
making ends meet. For these people, having social relationships and ties is critical for survival. 
Even for those who are not usually in need, the social network becomes important when natural 
disasters or crop failures cause income fluctuations, making it difficult for them to sustain the 
minimum standard of living. 
Fukuyama (2002) and Putnam (1995)  among others, argue that social capital is a crucial 
factor in facilitating institutional and economic development. Putnam (1995) defines social 
capital as “features of social life – networks, norms and trust – that enable participants to act 
together more effectively to pursue shared objectives.” Fukuyama (2002) describes social capital 
as “any instance in which people cooperate for common ends on the basis of shared informal 
norms and values”, and claims social capital is “simply a means of understanding the role that 
values and norms play in economic life.” Knack and Keefer (1997) find simple expressions of 
trust (from the General Social Survey) correlate with economic success across countries.  
One kind of social capital is the willingness to provide social insurance in the form of 
private transfers. In developing countries where the social safety net is inadequate, private 
transfers between households play an important role in smoothing out income shocks (Cox et al., 
2004, Cox and Jimenez, 1998, Rosenzweig and Stark, 1989, Townsend, 1994). However, it has 
been demonstrated that public transfers may crowd-out private transfers (Becker, 1974, Cox, 
1987, Cox and Jimenez, 1992). 
Recently, there has been a substantial rise of experimental research on games and 
decisions related to social capital (Camerer, 2003, chapter 2,  Glaeser et al., 2000, Karlan, 2005). 
An experiment enables us to observe social interactions in controlled environments. By carefully 
controlling the information subjects are provided, we can examine how social and economic 
status affects the way people interact (Bernhard et al., 2006, Falk and Zehnder, 2007, Fershtman 
and Gneezy, 2001, Habyarimana et al., 2009, Wilson and Whitt, 2007). However, as Wilson and 
Eckel (forthcoming) point out, it is sometimes difficult to judge whether the behaviors observed 
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in an experiment mimic behavior in a particular naturally-occurring setting which has many 
different features. (A similar concern arises in generalizing from one exotic field experiment to 
likely behavior in a different location, so the problem of generalizability is not special to 
artificial abstract experimental choices; see e.g., Banerjee and Duflo, in press).  
In this paper, we combine survey and experimental data from Vietnam and try to link 
evidence on transfers in the survey data to corresponding behavior in experiments on pro-social 
trust, conducted for high stakes.1 We use the trust game, which has been used to study social 
exchange in many studies (Camerer and Weigelt, 1988,  Berg et al., 1995, Bohnet et al., 2008, 
Glaeser, et al., 2000, Karlan, 2005, King-Casas et al, 2006). Using the trust game, we can 
examine whether people are willing to make transfers to others when there is no guarantee that 
their kindness will be reciprocated.  
Vietnam has several advantages as a research site:  
1. Northern and Southern Vietnam have different political histories. Villages in the north 
moved rapidly toward collectivization under communism in the 1950s, while people in the south 
resisted collectivization. By 1986, less than 6 percent of the farmers in the south participated in 
cooperatives, while about 95 percent of farmers in the north belonged to cooperatives (Pingali 
and Xuan, 1992, Xuan, 1995).2  Cooperatives were not only the units of agricultural production, 
but also provided social safety net to their members (Kolko, 1997). 
2. As a result of the difference in the history of collectivization, a large social safety net 
system exists in the north, and only a limited social safety net exists in the south. This difference 
enables us to compare the pattern of public and private transfers in both regions, and investigate 
whether public safety net crowds out private transfers.3  We expect that public transfers crowd 
out private transfers in the north, but not in the south. 
3. A 2002 living standard survey conducted in Vietnam enabled us to link survey 
responses from individuals directly to experimental responses by the same individuals with very 
                                                 
1  Bahry and Wilson (2004) also conducted trust game with a subset of households which were 
covered in a large household survey in Russia.  
2 Fox and Joiner (1964) conducted a survey in the south Vietnam before the unification and 
observed animosity toward northerners among southerners. It may partly explain why southerners resisted 
collectivization after the unification. 
3 Alesina and Fuchs-Schundels (2007) examined the effects of communism on preferences for 
public policies by analyzing household survey data collected in former Eastern and Western Germany 
(2007). They found that people in former Eastern Germany showed a stronger preference for 
redistributive policies than people in former West Germany. 
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little sample attrition. Having the previous survey responses also enabled us to handpick a 
sample of villages with a wide range of average incomes to study the effect of cross-village 
income differences. This use of detailed survey data to control the design (by stratifying 
samples) and to link survey results to experimental results is essentially impossible to do in many 
other settings  (including typical lab experiments).  
4. Vietnamese villagers are mostly poor. As a result, it is easy to motivate them with 
financial stakes that are affordable and moderate by Western standards, but have a lot of local 
purchasing power (about 10 times as high as typical Western lab payments). This feature of 
experiments in poor countries addresses a long-standing concern about whether behavioral 
patterns are sensitive to the money at stake (they generally do not seem to be).  At the same time, 
Vietnamese are also highly literate, so we can be confident that they comprehend experimental 
instructions.4 
Our results of household data analysis show the probability of receiving private transfers 
increases with pre-transfer income in the south, where the social safety net is limited. In contrast, 
the probability of receiving private transfers does not correlate with pre-transfer income in the 
north where public transfers are more widespread. Public transfers  also crowd out private 
transfers in the north. 
The household survey data does not tell us the identities of the senders and receivers of 
private transfers. Therefore, we cannot distinguish private transfers made among family and non-
family within village communities. We conduct a trust game to directly measure the patterns of 
social exchange in both regions, and found consistent results. People in the south are more 
altruistic toward the poor: they send more to the poor without expecting higher repayment. This 
pattern is consistent with the idea that private norms of redistribution from rich to poor are active 
in the south but are crowded out in the north, possibly by communist public institutions. 
 
 
Patterns of Private Transfers in Vietnam: Household Data Analysis 
                                                 
4 According to the World Bank (2005), 45% of the rural population lives below the poverty line. 
So modest experimental payments, by Western standards, amount to several days’ wages. At the same 
time, the national literacy rate is around 90% (and is slightly higher in our sample), There are only three 
countries which are both poorer  (lower GNP per capita) and more literate-- Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and 
Uzbekistan (World Bank, 2005). 
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In this section, we analyze the 2002 Vietnam Household Living Standard Survey 
(VHLSS) to investigate the patterns of private transfers in the north and south of Vietnam. The 
survey was conducted with 3,848 households in the Red River Delta (in the north) and 3,972 
households in the Mekong River Delta (in the south). 
 
Theoretical Predictions 
Two motives for private transfers have been modeled and measured in the literature: 
altruism and self-interested exchange (Cox, 1987, Cox et al., 1998). Under the altruism 
hypothesis, private transfers are designed to enhance the utility of the recipient (and to indirectly 
satisfy the giver through a taste for altruism). The exchange hypothesis is that private transfers 
represent a kind of social insurance or karmic giving. Generous transfers are expected to be 
noticed and remembered by the recipient, who is in turn expected to repay with transfers back to 
the giver in the future, when they are valuable.  This kind of exchange functions as an informal 
banking system; a transfer is like money in a social bank of favors.  Both altruism and exchange 
hypotheses predict that the probability of any private transfers is inversely related to the pre-
transfer income of recipients (needy recipients get more). Regarding the amount of any transfers, 
an increase in recipients’ income is expected to reduce the amounts of transfers under the 
altruistic motivation hypothesis (since higher-earning recipients are less needy), whereas the 
exchange hypothesis does not necessarily predict such a crowding-out effect (since transfers to 
relatively-wealthy recipients might  have a higher chance of being repaid in the future).  
The answer to the question of whether private transfers are motivated by altruism or by 
self-interested exchange has important policy implications. Under the altruism hypothesis, public 
transfers will crowd out private transfers. Under the exchange hypothesis, public transfers will 
not crowd out private transfers. The empirical evidence is mixed. Studies from rural Indonesia 
(Ravallion and Dearden, 1988) and the Philippines (Cox, et al., 2004) support the altruistic 
motivation hypothesis. Other studies report evidences which are consistent with the exchange 
hypothesis and are inconsistent with the altruistic motivation hypothesis (Cox, 1987, Cox and 
Rank, 1992, Cox, et al., 1998).  
  5 
We hypothesize public transfers may crowd out private transfers in the north because 
public transfers are prevalent in this region, while public transfers do not crowd out  the level of 
private transfers in the south. 
 
Results 
Table 1 shows the number of households receiving private transfers, as well as overseas 
remittances and public transfers. Private transfer is  extensively practiced in both regions (82% in 
the north and 75% in the south). However public transfers are more widespread in north (23%) 
than in south (8%). 
 
Figure 1 graphs the mean income of the households by type of transfers they receive. The 
graph shows the mean income of households receiving public transfers is above the mean income 
in the north (after transfers), while the mean income of households receiving public transfers is 
below the mean income of the region in the south. This suggests that while public transfers are 
limited in number in the south, they are targeted toward the poor.  
We conducted probit regressions for the probability of receiving private transfers, and 
OLS regressions using the amount of private transfers received as the dependent variable for 
both regions. Table 2 shows regression results. (See Table A.1 in the Appendix for variable 
definitions.) 
 
Let us first look at the factors correlated with the probability of receiving private 
transfers. Pre-transfer income (defined as income minus private transfers, public transfers and 
oversea remittance) is negatively correlated with the chance of receiving private transfers in the 
south, but not in the north. Mean village income is positively correlated with the chance of 
receiving private transfers in the north but is negatively correlated with the probability of private 
transfers in the south. Overseas is negatively correlated and hence crowds out private transfers in 
both regions. Senders of private transfers are more likely to also receive private transfers in both 
regions, suggesting private transfers are partly motivated by exchange. The amount of the public 
transfers is negatively correlated with the chance of receiving private transfers in the north but 
not in the south, indicating the crowding out effects of public transfers on private transfers in the 
north. Households with household heads who are underemployed, female, or especially young or 
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old are more likely to receive private transfers in north. The village Gini coefficient is negatively 
correlated with the probability of private transfers in both regions. Since a high Gini coefficient 
indicates substantial inequality, this correlation means more income-equal villages have more 
private transfers.  
The amount of the transfers is positively correlated with mean village income and with 
the probability that a person sends any transfer, in both regions. Pre-transfer income is negatively 
correlated not only with the chance of receiving private transfers but also with the amount of 
private transfers received in the south. This suggests private transfers flow from high-income 
households to low-income households in the south and are altruistic rather than exchange-
motivated. 
In summary, the results of household data analysis show private transfers flow from high-
income households to low-income households in the south where social safety net is limited. In 
contrast, private transfers do not correlate with pre-transfer income in the north. In addition, 
public transfers crowd out private transfers in the north where public transfers are more 
widespread. Our empirical results from the south are partially consistent the altruism hypothesis 
of Cox (1987). The amount of private transfers is correlated with pre-transfer income. However, 
contrary to the altruism hypothesis of Cox (1987), our empirical finding suggest the probability 
of private transfers also correlate with pre-transfer income. 
To see these patterns another way, we pooled the data from the south and north and 
conducted regressions with regional interaction term “North” for each of the independent 
variables used in Table 2. The regressions results are shown in Table A.2 in the Appendix. The 
interaction term “North” for public transfers is significant at the 10% level. 
The survey data does not tell us the identities of the senders and receivers of private 
transfers. Therefore, we cannot distinguish private transfers made among family and non-family 
within village communities. However, according to Cox (2002), only 32% of households 
received private transfers from family and relatives in the 1992/93 and 1997/98 household 
survey, while the 2002 household data indicates 82 and 85 percents of households received some 
kind of private transfers. This suggests a substantial percentage of private transfers are made 
among non-relatives in our data. 
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The Trust Game 
 
The results from the survey data analysis indicate that private transfers generally flow 
from the rich to the poor in the south, while this is not the case in the north. However, the survey 
data does not tell us the identities of the senders and receivers of transfers. Thus, we do not know 
whether there exists a norm of income redistribution from the rich to the poor within 
communities. In order to directly observe whether individual people are willing to transfer 
money to the poor, we conducted a trust game with a subset of household members who were 
interviewed in the 2002 living standard measurement survey.  
We conducted the trust game of Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995), a continuous 
relative of the binary trust game introduced much earlier by Camerer and Weigelt (1988). The 
trust game is played by two players; Player 1 and Player 2. Both Player 1 and Player 2 are 
endowed with 20,000 dong, about a day’s wage in Vietnam.5 Player 1 is then given a chance to 
send some money to Player 2 (in multiples of 2,000 dong). The experimenter triples the amount 
sent before it reaches Player 2. Player 2 is then asked to send back as much money as he wants 
(including zero).  
The trust game can be viewed as a highly stylized model of efficient (mutually-
beneficial) investment with no contractual protection against moral hazard (i.e., Player 2 can 
keep all the money without an explicit penalty for doing so). At the same time, it can also be 
seen as a temporally-compressed version of a social exchange game in which one player gives 
money presuming another player will give some of it back. Player 2’s repayment is a measure of 
moral obligation or positive reciprocity. Player 1’s initial investment combines altruistic giving 
and an expectation of repayment. Nava Ashraf, Iris Bohnet and Nikita Piankov (2004), Michael 
R. Carter and Marco Castillo (2002), and Håkan J. Holm and Anders Dalienson (2005) 
demonstrate how trusting behavior can be apparent evidence of altruism, because trusting 
investors often do not expect to have much money repaid. 
There are many studies using trust games. An important difference between our study and 
others is that we divided subjects into three wealth groups, namely, high-income, middle-income 
                                                 
5 The exchange rate at the time of the experiments was about 16,000 dong/dollar.  
  8 
and low-income groups, and investigated whether people change their behavior when they are 
matched with people of different wealth levels.  
Having observed that private transfers flow from the rich to the poor in the south, we 
predict Player 1 sends more to Player 2 if Player 2 belongs to a low-income group in the south. 
We may observe in-group bias in the north, i.e., people trust more and reciprocate more toward 
the people in their own group, since people worked together in collective farms for many years 
in the north.  
 
Selection of Research Sites and Experimental Procedure 
In July-August 2005, we conducted a trust game6 with members of households who were 
previously interviewed during a 2002 living standard measurement survey. In the 2002 survey, 
25 households were interviewed in 142 rural villages in the Mekong Delta (in the south) and 137 
rural villages in the Red River Delta (in the north). From these, we chose nine villages, five 
villages in the south and four villages in the north, with substantial differences in mean income, 
inequality, and market access to permit statistically powerful cross-village comparisons.  
Some descriptive statistics about the nine experimental village sites are given in Table 3. 
See Table A.1 in the Appendix for variable definitions. The southern villages are indexed by S1, 
S2, S3, S4, and S5 (where S1 indexes the highest village wealth and S5 indexes the lowest), and 
northern villages are indexed by N1, N2, N3, and N4, respectively.  
A week before the experiments, research coordinators contacted local government 
officials in each research site, and asked them to invite one person from each of the 25 
previously surveyed households to the experiments.7 The response rate was high (82 percent), 
which limits concern about self-selection in participation. Figure A.1 in the Appendix shows 
pictures of all research sites (village meeting rooms or school classrooms). 
                                                 
6 Risk and time discounting experiments were also conducted after the trust game, and are 
reported in Tanaka, Camerer and Nguyen (fothcoming) 
7 Village officials were asked to prepare one extra subject in case the total number of subjects 
turned out to be an odd number (because an even number of subjects are needed to play the trust game). 
In three out of nine villages, an odd number of subjects showed up to the experiment. In those villages, 
we included an additional subject in the experiment to create an even number in order to do pairwise trust 
game matching. We did not have 2002 survey data from these “equalizer” subjects. We followed village 
officials’ advice when placing the additional subjects into respective income categories. 
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Before the experiments, potential subjects were divided into three groups, H, M and L  
(high, medium, and low) based on their wealth from the 2002 survey.8 Groups H, M and L were 
called Groups A, B, and C in the experiments. Subjects were assigned ID numbers upon arrival. 
Their IDs are numbered by A1, A2,…, B1, B2, …. C1, C2,.. After all subjects arrived, we 
assigned them seats according to their subject IDs. Subjects in Group A, B and C were seated on 
the right, middle and left sides of the room, and were given white, yellow, and red ID tags and 
folders, respectively. They were not told the grouping was based on wealth, because we did not 
want to induce demand effects (i.e., a presumption, inferred from visible categorization, that 
wealth categories should matter in their choices) but most people in these small villages know 
each other and their approximate wealth very well. 
After an experimenter reads the instruction, the subjects solved a quiz. Illiterate subjects 
and subjects who had difficulty understanding the game were helped by research assistants.9 
After having solved the quiz, subjects went out of the room, one by one, and drew numbered 
balls in a bingo cage. The subjects who drew odd numbers were assigned the roles of Player 1.  
Subjects who drew an even number were assigned the role of Player 2. Figure A.2 in the 
Appendix illustrates the experimental procedures.  
We used the strategy method, asking Player 1 how much they would send to Player 2 if 
Player 2 was in each of Groups A, B and C, respectively. Therefore, there is a within-subject 
comparison of how Player 1’s react to player 2’s in different income groups (which is much 
more powerful than between-subjects comparisons). In addition, Player 1’s reported how much 
they expected to get back from Player 2 in Group A, B and C, respectively. We used the strategy 
method for Player 2 as well, asking how much they would send back to Player 1 for each of the 
ten possible positive investments. The English translation of the instruction is provided in the 
Appendix.  
                                                 
8 To create H, M and L groups we ranked households by their total income, per capita household 
income and per capita expenditure using the 2002 living standard measurement, respectively. If a 
household is within top eight in all three criteria among 25 households, or two criteria are within the top 
eight and the other criterion is in the middle range (ranking between 9 and 16), then the household is 
categorized as Group H. If all three criteria are within the bottom 8 among the 25 potential households, or 
two criteria are within the bottom 8 and the other criterion is in the middle range, then the household is 
categorized as Group M. The rest of households are categorized as Group L.  
9 Since the waiting time was long for the subjects who could not finish the quiz quickly, we had 
enough time to explain the game to those slow subjects. Eventually, all subjects passed the quiz. 
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There are many challenges of field experiments like these, and some advantages. The 
challenges include these: To the extent subjects respond to perceived experimenter demands or 
are influenced by some kind of experimenter authority, such effects could conceivably be 
magnified in these settings (a challenge familiar to every anthropologist). Translating languages 
is sometimes important since the words used to describe these exchange games can influence 
behavior (we used back-translation in which the Vietnamese coauthor translated instructions 
from English and then another coder translated that translation back to English so we could 
check what mutations occurred in the round-trip across languages). The fact that our results are 
generally comparable to those in many other populations suggests demand and language 
translation effects are not dramatically changing the results compared to other experiments.  
Vietnam also presented a surprising advantage over many other experimental settings 
because the subjects took the experiments very seriously. They were attentive and asked questions—
more so than many Western college subjects, who often skim instructions and sometimes make 
avoidable mistakes that significantly impact experiment results. The household survey data also 
allowed us to know more about the socioeconomic characteristics of our subjects than in almost any 
experiments ever conducted in a typical Western psychology lab. The survey data also provided us a 
rich list of variables to control for other factors that correlate with income (such as education and 
ethnicity). This extra data is extremely useful since most studies focus on a single interesting 
sociodemographic dimension, such as gender or ethnicity, and do not control at all for obvious 
covariates with that focal dimension.  
 
Experimental Results 
The mean amounts sent by Player 1 in the trust game were 5,707 dong and 7,840 dong in 
the south and north, respectively. Player 1 in the north sends significantly more to Player 2 than 
Player 1 do in the south (paired t-test, p=0.01). The fractions sent by Player 1’s in the south and 
north were 28 percent and 40 percent, respectively. Player 2’s in the north sends back 
significantly more to Player 1’s than Player 2’s do in the south (paired t-test, p=0.002). However, 
these repayment rates are a little lower than other studies conducted in Zimbabwe, South Africa, 
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Honduras, Tanzania, Kenya, Bangladesh, Peru, Uganda, and Paraguay (see Cardenas and 
Carpenter (2005) for a review).10  
Figure 2 illustrates the mean amount sent by Player 1 (the sender) in each village. The 
most striking difference is in the south where there is a substantial gap between the mean 
amounts sent to different groups of receivers: the southern subjects send more to the lower 
income group (Group L) and less to the high income groups  (Group H). This pattern is visible in 
all the villages in the south except S2. However, notice from Table 3 that the Gini coefficient of 
village S2 is small, 0.19, and the mean income of groups M and L are close. It may have been 
difficult for the subjects to recognize any difference in wealth between groups M and L (or to 
care as much about helping the relatively-well-off group)..  In contrast, there is no significant 
difference in the amount sent by income group of receivers in northern villages.  As shown in 
Table 3, the Gini coefficient of northern villages are similar to those of the southern villages, so 
the difference in behavior cannot be due to village-level differences in inequality in the north and 
south. 
The mean amount sent by Player 1 in the south and north (aggregating across villages) is 
shown in Figure 3. All three income groups send significantly more to the low and medium 
income groups than to the high income group in the south. On the contrary, Player 1s in the north 
do not differentiate the amount sent to different income groups, except for medium income group 
which sends significantly more to their own group members than to the high-income group 
members. We do not observe in-group bias either in the north or south, i.e., neither Player 1 nor 
Player 2 send significantly more to members of their own groups. 
Figure 4 shows the mean expected return by income group of Player 2. The expected 
return ratio is calculated as the expected amount of money back divided by the amount of money 
sent (tripled amount).  Both in the south and north, Player 1 do not expect higher returns from the 
low-income group. A natural interpretation of the tendency in the south therefore is that the 
subjects give more to the poor (the L group), and less to the rich (the H group) because they are 
redistributing wealth, not because they expect repayment. The fact that this pattern is less evident 
in the north suggests an effect of political institutions crowding out private transfers—in the 
                                                 
10  Barr (1999, 2001), Ensminger (2000), Carter and Castillo (2003, 2002), Mosley and Vershoor 
(2003), Johansson-Stenman et al. (2004), Holm and Danielson (2005), Karlan (2005), and Schechter 
(2005). 
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north, communist redistribution equalizes resources, but in the south, villagers privately 
redistribute income from rich to poor on their own.  
Table 4 shows the results of linear regressions on the amount sent by Player 1. We 
conducted regressions for the south and north separately.11 We also pooled data from two regions 
and conducted regressions with regional interaction terms “North”. The results of the pooled data 
analysis are shown in Table A.3 in the Appendix. The regression results demonstrate Player 1s 
send significantly larger amount of money to lower income groups, Groups M and L, in the south 
while this redistribution trend is much weaker in the north. This is consistent with our earlier 
observation that Player 1 in the south send significantly more to the low and medium income 
groups than to the high income group while Player 1 in the north do not differentiate the amount 
sent to different income groups. It also suggests there may exist different sharing norms in the 
south and north.  
In the north, Player 1s who received a higher amount of oversea remittance and private 
transfers send significantly more to Player 2, an indication of communal sharing. On the 
contrary, in the south, individuals who received a higher amount of private transfer send 
significantly less, while those who gave out a higher amount of private transfer send significantly 
more to Player 2. In both regions, the members of households which made larger public 
donations also send a significantly larger amount of money to Player 2. The Gini coefficient 
effect on trust is negative and significant in the south, (i.e., trust is highter in more income-equal 
villages) and is also significant for the pooled data estimations. Our findings support Knack and 
Keefer’s (1997) conclusion that trust is positively correlated with equality. 
Figure 5 illustrates the amount of money sent back by Player 2 in each session. The x and 
y axes represent the amounts sent and returned, respectively. The amount returned is greater than 
the amount sent in most northern villages and across all income groups, indicating trust pays off 
in the north. By contrast, the amount returned is greater than the amount sent only for Group L in 
Villages S1 and S2, the wealthiest villages. It may be that Group L in these wealthy villages felt 
they needed to prove they are not underprivileged.  
                                                 
11 Since there are repeated observations on individual subjects, we specified that the observations 
are not independent within subjects. We also ran regressions with the survey responses to the GSS 
questions on trust, fairness and helpfulness, but they were not significant. 
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Table 5 presents the results of generalized linear model estimations on the proportion of 
money sent back by Player 2.12 The results of pooled data analysis are shown in Table A.4 in the 
Appendix. In the north, being male, lower donations, high relative income within the village and 
engagement in trading activities are correlated with reciprocity. In the south, lower donations, 
engagement in trading activities, high relative income within the village, and the number of 
government officers present in the experimental session are positively correlated with 
reciprocity. Fishermen and people living in wealthier villages reciprocate less. People in the 
middle and low income groups reciprocate less, but if they live in wealthier villages, they 
reciprocate more, which is consistent with our earlier observations.  
Coefficients of relative income are positive in both regressions. This implies wealthy 
individuals are more inclined to reciprocate.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Private transfers between households play an important role in risk sharing in developing 
countries. However, private transfers could be crowded out by public transfers. We explore this 
question by combining a detailed household survey of Vietnamese villages with original 
experiments on trust investment games.  Vietnam is an especially interesting target location 
because the history of communism in the north (and post-1975, in the south) creates a natural 
historical accident that could influence long-held behaviors. We also have unique access to 
detailed survey data and, since Vietnamese are typically poor but highly literate, and thus present 
a ready pool of subjects who comprehend experimental instruction and are highly motivated by 
money. 
 While there are many subtle details in our findings, there are three basic implications. 
First, the survey data shows that private transfers flow from high-income households to low-
income households in the south, representing voluntary redistribution or social insurance. In the 
north however, private transfers do not correlate with recipient pre-transfer income (the poor are 
not getting more) and public transfers crowd out private transfers. Second, the trust game data 
largely reproduces this pattern of voluntary redistribution which is stronger in the south than in 
                                                 
12  We estimated a generalized linear model with a logit link and the binomial family because the 
dependent variable is a proportion.  
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the north. This is consistent with the idea that trust in the south represents altruistic giving. Third, 
we observe higher trust and reciprocity in the north. This is consistent with a “crowding in” of 
socialistic attitudes toward sharing in the north which spill over to these games.  
In any cross-sectional study like this, it is difficult to infer the direction of causality from 
correlation: Did the difference in the history of collectivization shape different social relations in 
two regions? Or did the difference in the history of communism in two regions originate from 
different social structures across two regions? While our study was designed to compare social 
relations in two regions, it was neither designed to infer causality from correlation, nor to 
investigate how the social structures before communism affect the present social relations.  
Terry A. Rambo (1973) reports that the village communities were different in the north 
and south before communism. Northern villages had communally-owned land, public granaries 
for famine relief, and crop-watching societies, while southern villages did not. Rambo 
conjectures that environmental differences in the two regions influenced the formation of such 
different social structures. Northern Vietnam was characterized by high population density, a 
shortage of land, and a severe natural environment. People had to cooperate to build extensive 
systems of dikes to protect their farmland and dwelling from floods. On the other hand, Southern 
Vietnam was lightly populated, and land was abundant. Flood control was not a major concern in 
the south, and there was no need for people to organized themselves to protect their lives. 
It is possible that higher levels of trust and reciprocity observed in north originate from 
the social structure that existed in the pre-communist era. However, if the northern village 
community had a more effective social safety net system and a stronger sense of solidarity in the 
pre-communist era, as Rambo argues, then we should observe large income transfers to the poor 
in the north rather than in the south. Our results of household data analysis and experiments are 
inconsistent with this hypothesis. We conjecture that the establishment of communist public 
institutions, after the era of spontaneous social cooperation Rambo documents, crowded out 
private transfers and altruistic attitudes toward the poor in the north.  
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Table 1: Number of households which received transfers in the 2002 household survey 
 North (%) South (%) 
Total number of households interviewed 6,349  6,294  
 Number of households receiving no transfers 820 (13) 1,250 (20) 
 Number of households receiving oversea remittance  201 (3) 406 (6) 
 Number of households receiving (domestic) private transfers 5,220 (82) 4,738 (75) 
 Number of households receiving public transfers  1,469 (23) 521 (8) 
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Table 2: Determinants of private transfers  
 
Probability of receiving private 
transfers Amount of private transfers 
 North  South  North  South  
Income before transfers -0.002 
(0.001) 
 -0.004 
(0.001) 
*** 0.001 
(0.004) 
 -0.005 
(0.003) 
* 
Mean village income 0.008 
(0.004) 
** -0.007 
(0.004) 
* 0.038 
(0.008) 
*** 0.043 
(0.009) 
*** 
Oversea remittance  -0.030 
(0.008) 
*** -0.020 
(0.005) 
*** -0.022 
(0.006) 
*** -0.002 
(0.009) 
 
Public transfer  -0.031 
(0.011) 
*** -0.017 
(0.023) 
 -0.016 
(0.044) 
 0.026 
(0.577) 
 
Sender of private transfers 
(dummy) 
0.200 
(0.097) 
** 0.338 
(0.048) 
*** 0.285 
(0.119) 
** 0.458 
(0.088) 
*** 
Education cost  
  (% of income) 
0.580 
(0.332) 
* 0.256 
(0.476) 
 -0.511 
(0.459) 
 -0.685 
(0.762) 
 
Health cost  
  (% of income) 
0.493 
(0.385) 
 0.148 
(0.207) 
 0.752 
(0.247) 
*** 1.110 
(0.484) 
** 
Wedding cost  
  (% of income) 
2.482 
(0.927) 
*** 2.919 
(0.829) 
*** 11.742 
(1.335) 
*** 21.559 
(2.635) 
*** 
Funeral cost  
  (% of income) 
0.106 
(0.373) 
 1.845 
(0.535) 
*** 2.891 
(1.560) 
* 2.686 
(1.411) 
* 
Male headed  
  (=1 if male headed) 
-0.255 
(0.074) 
*** 0.011 
(0.660) 
 -0.710 
(0.203) 
*** -0.119 
(0.129) 
 
Education 0.015 
(0.010)) 
 0.018 
(0.007) 
** 0.100 
(0.020) 
*** 0.058 
(0.020) 
*** 
Age -0.026 
(0.013) 
** -0.009 
(0.010) 
 0.000 
(0.024) 
 0.002 
(0.021) 
 
Age^2 0.000 
(0.000) 
*** 0.000 
(0.000) 
 0.000 
(0.000) 
 0.000 
(0.000) 
 
Divorced -0.135 
(0.213) 
 0.154 
(0.162) 
 -0.660 
(0.410) 
 -0.006 
(0.224) 
 
Single 0.048 
(0.176) 
 0.063 
(0.158) 
 -0.519 
(0.247) 
** -0.233 
(0.209) 
 
Widow 0.004 
(0.108) 
 0.093 
(0.840) 
 -0.428 
(0.251) 
* -0.116 
(0.171) 
 
Separated 0.054 
(0.318) 
 0.231 
(0.255) 
 -0.633 
(0.320) 
** -0.311 
(0.294) 
 
Working days -0.011 
(0.004) 
*** -0.001 
(0.003) 
 -0.008 
(0.010) 
 -0.003 
(0.007) 
 
Gini coefficient -2.085 
(0.353) 
*** -1.568 
(0.262) 
*** -0.603 
(0.839) 
 -0.786 
(0.493) 
 
Constant 1.906 
(0.355) 
*** 1.031 
(0.287) 
*** -0.045 
(0.716) 
 -0.601 
(0.559) 
 
Observations 3848  3972  3848  3972  
(Pseudo) R2 0.05  0.004  0.09  0.11  
  20 
Note: * Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. *** Significant at the 1% level. 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics 
  S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 N1 N2 N3 N4 
Number of subjects (Number of Chinese subjects are in parentheses)  
   Total 22 (9) 16 18 22 (1) 22 18 22 24 20 
  Of which ethnic Chinese  
 9 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
   Group H  6 (4) 5 7 7 (1) 7 5 8 8 6 
   Group M  9 (3) 7 7 9 9 6 7 9 9 
   Group L 7 (2) 4 4 6 6 7 7 7 5 
Mean household income in 2002 (in 1 million dong) 
   Total 36.6 35.8 20.3 18.5 15.0 28.0 17.5 9.1 6.8 
   Group H  80.6 51.9 26.1 32.6 29.5 49.0 29.2 14.4 13.5 
   Group M 21.3 29.9 19.9 14.9 11.8 26.8 13.4 7.8 5.0 
   Group L  18.4 26.1 10.6 6.9 5.3 14.0 8.2 4.7 2.1 
Age (mean) 47.7 44.6 48.8 43.1 48.3 54.1 42.5 49.9 48.6 
Gender (mean) 0.59 0.88 0.83 0.68 0.82 0.44 0.36 0.50 0.50 
Education(mean)  7.2 7.1 8.4 5.8 5.0 7.8 8.0 4.8 7.6 
Literacy rate 0.95 0.94 0.95 0.95 0.91 0.89 0.95 0.83 0.90 
Acquaintance 
ratio     
   (mean) 0.42 0.86 0.76 0.74 0.82 0.62 0.91 0.98 0.90 
Main occupation of the subject in percent (multiple answers allowed) 
Farming 0 13 17 91 77 6 0 83 75 
Livestock 5 19 56 50 32 6 45 54 10 
Fishery 0 94 22 9 9 0 0 17 0 
Trade 36 0 0 5 5 28 14 8 5 
Business 23 0 17 0 5 6 14 8 10 
Government 
officer 9 19 22 14 14 22 18 25 10 
Casual work 27 0 11 5 14 0 5 17 10 
Not working 23 0 17 0 9 50 9 8 15 
Village-level data from the 2002 Living Standard Measurement Survey (25 households) 
Village Gini  
   coefficients 0.44 0.19 0.30 0.36 0.38 0.29 0.38 0.28 0.36 
Distance to 
nearest  
   market  0.0 5.0 0.0 4.2 0.0 0.0 1.0 3.0 0.3 
Daily wage for male labor for harvesting (1000 dong) 
 - - 30 30 30 18 18 20 20 
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Table 4: Determinants of the amount sent by Player 1 
 North  South  
Chinese    -775 (1,313)  
Age 159 (343)  -48 (145)  
Age^2 -2 (4)  -1 (2)  
Gender 2,678 (2,011)  1,013 (870)  
Education 260 (207)  -379 (104) *** 
Oversea remittance 343 (79) *** 10 (16)  
Public transfers 278 (523)  460 (850)  
Private transfers (received) 646 (220) *** -337 (138) ** 
Private transfers (sent) -3,299 (3,479)  1,404 (650) ** 
Donation 14,889 (7,343) ** 25,769 (13,945) * 
Acquaintance ratio 7,246 (6,329)  1,617 (1,446)  
Farm/livestock -1,833 (1,783)  -1,910 (1,176)  
Fishery -4,640 (2,817)  -3,756 (1,881) * 
Trade 2,936 (2,634)  4,672 (820) *** 
Business -5,012 (3,136) * -1,863 (948) * 
Government officer 7 (1,942)  -2,301 (1,264) * 
Relative income -524 (1,062)  -1,213 (585) ** 
Mean village income -252 (120) ** 160 (50) *** 
Gini coefficient -51,359 (33,568)  -16,432 (7,573) ** 
Number of officers 368 (1,026)  114 (130)  
Group M 634 (551)  1,866 (404) *** 
Group L 1366 (730) * 2,589 (612) *** 
Constant 15,618 (11,209)  11,320 (3,582) *** 
Observations 123   147   
R2 0.43    0.46    
Note: * Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. *** Significant at the 1% level.  
We conducted robust regressions, and adjusted standard errors for correlations within 
individuals. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 5: Determinants of the proportion sent back by Player 2 
 
 North   South   
Chinese    0.264 (0.234)  
Age -0.012 (0.042)  0.015 (0.047)  
Age^2 0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000)  
Gender 0.737 (0.137) *** 0.217 (0.217)  
Education -0.021 (0.023)  -0.021 (0.030)  
Oversea remittance -0.002 (0.005)  0.011 (0.017)  
Public transfers -0.047 (0.042)  -0.523 (0.173) *** 
Private transfers (received) 0.043 (0.030)  0.084 (0.059)  
Private transfers (received) 0.233 (0.172)  0.121 (0.180)  
Donation -8.406 (4.028) ** 0.239 (3.552)  
Acquaintance ratio -0.009 (0.012)  0.023 (0.019)  
Farm/livestock -0.157 (0.142)  -0.021 (0.237)  
Fishery 0.189 (0.217)  -1.158 (0.485) ** 
Trade 0.888 (0.174) *** 0.528 (0.302) * 
Business -0.101 (0.197)  0.127 (0.273)  
Government officer -0.106 (0.185)  -0.375 (0.333)  
Relative income 0.375 (0.075) *** 0.425 (0.146) *** 
Mean village income -0.014 (0.014)  -0.042 (0.020) ** 
Gini coefficient -2.375 (1.820)  -2.217 (1.936)  
Number of officers 0.016 (0.066)  0.626 (0.280) ** 
Group M 0.281 (0.284)  -1.398 (0.656) * 
M*Mean village income -0.013 (0.017)  0.073 (0.024) *** 
Group L -0.037 (0.454)  -1.605 (0.969) * 
L*Mean village income 0.014 (0.023)  0.100 (0.035) *** 
Constant 0.454 (1.603)  -1.515 (1.936)  
Observations 409   476   
Log pseudolikelihood -179.9    -199.0    
Note: * Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5% level.  *** Significant at the 1% level.  
Since the dependent variable is a proportion, we estimated a generalized linear model with a logit 
link and the binomial family, and adjusted standard errors for correlations within individuals. 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Figure 1: Mean income of households by types of transfers 
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Figure 2: Mean amount sent by Player 1 (sender) in each village 
South  
 
North 
   
*, **, and *** indicate the amount sent to this group is significantly higher the amount sent 
to Group H at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels by paired t-test, respectively. The 
bars are standard errors. Groups H, M and L are high-income, middle-income, and low-
income groups, respectively.   
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Figure 3: Mean amount sent by Player 1 by income groups of Player 1 and Player 2 
 
South 
 
 
North 
 
 
*, **, and *** indicate the amount sent to this group is significantly higher the amount sent to 
Group H at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels by paired t-test, respectively. The bars are 
standard errors.
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Figure 4: The ratio of expected return by income group of Player 2 in each village 
 
South        
 
 
North        
 
* indicates the expected return rate to this group is significantly lower than the expected return 
rate of Group H at the 10% significance levels by paired t-test. The bars are standard errors.
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Figure 5:  Amounts sent back by Player 2 (1000 dong) 
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Appendix 
Table A.1: Variable definitions 
Variable name Description 
Age Age of the subject 
Gender  Gender of the subject, 1=male 
Education Number of years the subject attended school 
Acquaintance ratio Number of other subjects the subject knows by name divided by the 
total number of subjects in the session 
Farm/livestock Subject's main occupation is farming or raising livestock 
Fishery Subject's main occupation is fishing 
Trade Subject's main occupation is trading 
Business The subject is engaged in household business 
Government officer The subject works for a local government 
Relative income The difference between subject's household income and mean income 
of the village divided by the standard deviation of income within the 
village 
Mean village income Mean household income of the village (million dong) 
Gini coefficient  Gini coefficient of the income among 25 households surveyed in 2002 
Distance to market  Distance to the nearest local market (km) 
(Table 2)  
Income before transfers Total household income minus private transfer, public transfer and 
oversea remittance received (million dong) 
Oversea remittance The amount of oversea remittance the subject’s household received 
(million dong) 
Public transfer The amount of public transfer the subject’s household received (million 
dong) 
Working days The number of days the household head worked during the survey year 
(Table 4)  
Private transfer 
(received) 
The amount of domestic private transfer the subject’s household 
received (million dong) 
Private transfer (sent) The amount of domestic private transfer the subject’s household sent 
(million dong) 
Donation The amount of public donations the subject’s household made (million 
dong) 
Number of officers Number of local government officers in the session 
Group M 1=Player 2 is in Group M 
Group L 1=Player 2 is in Group L 
(Table 5)  
Group M 1=if Player 2 is in Group M 
M*Mean village income The cross effect of Mean village income and Player 2 being in Group 
M 
Group L 1=if Player 2 is in Group L 
L*Mean village income The cross effect of Mean village income and Player 2 being in Group L 
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Table A.2: Determinants of private transfers with regional interaction terms “North” 
 
Probability of private 
transfers 
Amount of private 
transfers 
IIncome before transfers -0.072 (0.024) *** -0.029 (0.017) * 
   * North 0.039 (0.034)  0.032 (0.026)  
Mean village income -0.007 (0.004) * 0.013 (0.003) *** 
   * North 0.015 (0.005) *** -0.001 (0.004)  
Oversea remittance  -0.115 (0.028) *** -0.003 (0.016)  
   * North 0.029 (0.036)  -0.016 (0.017)  
Public transfer  -0.017 (0.022)  0.008 (0.017)  
   * North -0.060 (0.035) * -0.020 (0.031)  
Sender of private transfers (dummy) 0.338 (0.048) *** 0.138 (0.027) *** 
   * North -0.138 (0.108)  -0.049 (0.046)  
Education cost (% of income) 0.256 (0.476)  -0.207 (0.231)  
   * North 0.325 (0.581)  0.047 (0.272)  
Health cost (% of income) 0.148 (0.207)  0.335 (0.146) ** 
   * North 0.346 (0.437)  -0.100 (0.165)  
Wedding cost (% of income) 2.919 (0.829) *** 6.515 (0.796) *** 
   * North -0.437 (1.244)  -2.838 (0.899) *** 
Funeral cost (% of income) 1.845 (0.535) *** 0.812 (0.426) * 
   * North -1.739 (0.652)  0.093 (0.648)  
Male headed (=1 if male headed) 0.011 (0.066)  -0.036 (0.039)  
   * North -0.266 (0.099) *** -0.186 (0.075) ** 
Education 0.018 (0.007) ** 0.017 (0.006) *** 
   * North -0.003 (0.012)  0.014 (0.009)  
Age -0.009 (0.010)  0.001 (0.006)  
   * North -0.018 (0.016)  0.000 (0.010)  
Age^2 0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000)  
   * North 0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000)  
Divorced 0.154 (0.162)  -0.002 (0.068)  
   * North -0.289 (0.267)  -0.205 (0.145)  
Single 0.063 (0.158)  -0.070 (0.063)  
   * North -0.015 (0.236)  -0.092 (0.100)  
Widow 0.093 (0.084)  -0.035 (0.052)  
   * North -0.089 (0.137)  -0.099 (0.094)  
Separated 0.231 (0.255)  -0.094 (0.089)  
   * North -0.177 (0.408)  -0.104 (0.134)  
Working days -0.001 (0.003)  -0.001 (0.002)  
   * North -0.009 (0.005)  -0.002 (0.004)  
Gini coefficient -1.568 (0.262) *** -0.238 (0.149)  
   * North -0.516 (0.440)  0.049 (0.302)  
North 0.903 (0.463) * 0.153 (0.289)  
Constant 0.937 (0.291) *** -0.579 (0.176) *** 
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Observations 7820   7820   
(Pseudo) R2 0.09   0.05   
Note: * Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. *** Significant at the 1% level. 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table A.3: Determinants of the amount sent by Player 1 with regional interaction terms 
“North” 
Chinese -775 (1,317)  
Age -48 (145)  
   * North 207 (369)  
Age^2 -1 (2)  
   * North -1 (4)  
Gender 1,013 (873)  
   * North 1,665 (2,171)  
Education -379 (104) *** 
   * North 639 (230) *** 
Oversea remittance 10 (16)  
   * North 333 (80) *** 
Public transfers 460 (852)  
   * North -181 (997)  
Private transfers (received) -337 (139) ** 
   * North 983 (258) *** 
Private transfers (sent) 1,404 (651) ** 
   * North -4,703 (3,499)  
Donation 25,769 (13,985) * 
   * North -10,879 (15,756)  
Acquaintance ratio 1,617 (1,450)  
   * North 5,629 (6,420)  
Farm/livestock -1,910 (1,179)  
   * North 77 (2,120)  
Fishery -3,756 (1,887) ** 
   * North -884 (3,363)  
Trade 4,672 (822) *** 
   * North -1,736 (2,730)  
Business -1,863 (950) * 
   * North -3,149 (3,241)  
Government officer -2,301 (1,268) * 
   * North 2,307 (2,300)  
Relative income -1,213 (587) ** 
   * North 689 (1,202)  
Mean village income 160 (50) *** 
   * North -412 (129) *** 
Gini coefficient -16,432 (7,595) ** 
   * North -34,927 (34,029)  
Number of officers 114 (130)  
   * North 254 (1,022)  
Group M 1,866 (405) *** 
   * North -1,232 (678) * 
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Group L 2,589 (614) *** 
   * North -1,223 (947)  
North 4,297 (11,644)  
Constant 11,320 (3,592) *** 
Observations 270   
Log pseudolikelihood -378.9   
Note: * Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. *** Significant at the 1% level.  
Since the dependent variable is a proportion, we estimated a generalized linear model with a logit 
link and the binomial family, and adjusted standard errors for correlations within individuals. 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table A.4: Determinants of the proportion sent back by Player 2 with regional interactions 
term “North” 
Chinese 0.264 (0.233)  
Age 0.015 (0.047)  
   * North -0.027 (0.063)  
Age^2 0.000 (0.000)  
   * North 0.000 (0.001)  
Gender 0.217 (0.216)  
   * North 0.520 (0.255) ** 
Education -0.021 (0.030)  
   * North 0.000 (0.038)  
Oversea remittance 0.011 (0.017)  
   * North -0.014 (0.018)  
Public transfers -0.523 (0.173) *** 
   * North 0.476 (0.178) *** 
Private transfers (received) 0.084 (0.059)  
   * North -0.040 (0.066)  
Private transfers (received) 0.121 (0.179)  
   * North 0.111 (0.248)  
Donation 0.239 (3.535)  
   * North -8.645 (5.340)  
Acquaintance ratio 0.023 (0.019)  
   * North -0.032 (0.022)  
Farm/livestock -0.021 (0.236)  
   * North -0.136 (0.274)  
Fishery -1.158 (0.483) ** 
   * North 1.346 (0.529) ** 
Trade 0.528 (0.300) * 
   * North 0.360 (0.346)  
Business 0.127 (0.271)  
   * North -0.228 (0.335)  
Government officer -0.375 (0.331)  
   * North 0.270 (0.379)  
Relative income 0.425 (0.145) *** 
   * North -0.050 (0.163)  
Mean village income -0.042 (0.020) ** 
   * North 0.029 (0.024)  
Gini coefficient -2.217 (1.926)  
   * North -0.159 (2.642)  
Number of officers 0.626 (0.279) ** 
   * North -0.610 (0.286) ** 
Group M -1.398 (0.653) ** 
   * North 1.679 (0.711) ** 
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M*Mean village income 0.073 (0.024) *** 
   * North -0.086 (0.029) *** 
Group L -1.605 (0.965) * 
   * North 1.568 (1.065)  
L*Mean village income 0.100 (0.035) *** 
   * North -0.087 (0.042) ** 
North 1.969 (2.500)  
Constant -1.515 (1.927)  
Observations 910   
R2 0.38   
Note: * Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. *** Significant at the 1% level.  
We conducted robust regressions, and adjusted standard errors for correlations within 
individuals. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Figure A.1: Research sites 
 
Village S1            Village S2 
      
 
Village S3            Village S4 
      
 
Village S5 
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Village N1            Village N2 
       
 
Village N3           Village N4 
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Figure A.2: Procedures of trust game (Pictures taken in Village S4) 
 
1) An experimenter reads the instruction. 
 
 
2) Subjects solve quiz. The few illiterate subjects are helped by research assistants. 
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3) After solving the quiz, subjects go out of the room and draw numbered balls from a bingo 
cage, which determines their roles (Player 1 or Player 2). Then, they receive instructions and 
record sheets. 
 
 
4) Subjects are helped by research assistants when making decisions. 
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Instruction 
 
Introductory Comments 
 
Thank you all for taking the time to come today. Today’s session will take as much as 4 hours, 
so if you think you will not be able to stay that long let us know now. Before we begin I want to 
make some general comments about what we are doing here today and explain the rules that we 
must follow. We will be playing some games with money. Whatever money you win in the 
games will be yours to keep and take home. 
 
We will be playing 3 games. We are about to begin the first game. It is important that you listen 
as carefully as possible. 
 
If you have any questions, please raise your hand and we will answer your questions in private. 
Please do not ask questions to your friends or talk about the game with them. This is very 
important. Please be sure that you obey this rule.  
 
Game 1 
 
This game is played by pairs of individuals. Each pair is made up of a Player 1 and a Player 2. 
Each of you will play this game with someone who’s identified as A, B or C. Please look around 
the room and remember who belong to which Identification Groups, A, B or C. It will help you 
to make decisions when you go out of the room.  
 
Group A has white nametags and white folders. Group B has yellow nametags and yellow 
folders. Group C has red nametags and red folders. 
 
After you finish exercises, we will ask you to go out of this room. Our research assistants will be 
waiting for you outside of this room. You will draw a lottery which will determine whether you 
will be playing either Player 1 of Player 2. If you draw an odd number such as 1, 3, 5, and 7, you 
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will play Player 1. If you draw an even number such as 2, 4, 6, and 8, you will play Player 2.  
 
This is how the game is played. 
 
We will give 20,000VND to Player 1 and another 20,000 VND to Player 2. Player 1 then has the 
chance to give a portion of their 20,000VND to Player 2. He/She could give 2,000VND, 
4,000VND, 6,000VND, 8,000VND, 10,000VND, 12,000VND, or 14,000VND, or 16,000VND, 
or 18,000VND, or 20,000VND, or nothing. Whatever amount Player 1 decides to give to Player 
2 will be tripled before it is passed on to Player 2. Player 2 then has the option of returning any 
amount of money they have to Player 1. Player 2 does not have to return any money if he/she 
does not want to. 
 
Now, we will go over some examples. We prepared Tables 1-10 to help you understand the 
game. 
 
Example 1 
 
Please look at Table 1. Imagine that Player 1 gives 2,000VND to Player 2. We will triple this 
amount, so Player 2 gets 6,000 VND (3 times 2,000 equals 6,000) in addition to their initial 
20,000VND. At this point, Player 1 has 18,000VND (20,000 minus 2,000) and Player 2 has 
26,000VND (20,000 plus 6,000).  
Now Player 2 has to decide whether they wish to give anything back to Player 1, and if so, how 
much. 
 
• If Player 2 returns nothing to Player 1, then Player 1 will make 18,000 VND, and 
Player 2 will make 26,000 VND in this game. 
• Suppose Player 2 decides to return 1,000 VND to Player 1. Then, Player 1 will 
make 19,000 VND (18,000 plus 1,000), and Player 2 will make 25,000 VND (26,000 
minus 1,000). 
• Suppose Player 2 decides to return 2,000 VND to Player 1. Then, Player 1 will 
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make 20,000 VND, and Player 2 will make 24,000 VND. 
• Suppose Player 2 decides to return 3,000 VND to Player 1. Then, Player 1 will 
earn 21,000 VND, and Player 2 will earn 23,000 VND. 
• Suppose Player 2 decides to return 4,000 VND to Player 1. Then, both Player 1 
and Player 2 will earn 22,000 VND.  
• Suppose Player 2 decides to return 5,000 VND to Player 1. Then, Player 1 will 
earn 23,000 VND, and Player 2 will earn 21,000 VND. 
• Suppose Player 2 decides to return 6,000 VND to Player 1. Then, Player 1 will 
earn 24,000 VND, and Player 2 will earn 20,000 VND.  
 
Let’s try another example.  
 
Example 2 
 
Let’s look at Table 8. Imagine that Player 1 gives 16,000VND to Player 2. We will triple this 
amount, so Player 2 gets 48,000VND (3 times 16,000 equals 48,000) in addition to their initial 
20,000VND. At this point, Player 1 has 4,000VND and Player 2 has 68,000VND.  
Then Player 2 has to decide whether they wish to give anything back to Player 1, and if so, how 
much.  
 
• If Player 2 returns nothing to Player 1, then Player 1 will earn 4,000VND, and 
Player 2 will earn 68,000 VND.  
• Suppose Player 2 decides to return 8,000VND to Player 1.  Player 1 will earn 
12,000VND and Player 2 will earn 60,000VND. 
• Suppose Player 2 decides to return 16,000VND to Player 1.  Player 1 will earn 
20,000VND and Player 2 will earn 52,000VND. 
• Suppose Player 2 decides to return 24,000VND to Player 1.  Player 1 will earn 
28,000VND and Player 2 will earn 44,000VND. 
• Suppose Player 2 decides to return 32,000VND to Player 1.  Both Player 1 and 
Player 2 will earn 36,000VND. 
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• Suppose Player 2 decides to return 40,000VND to Player 1.  Player 1 will earn 
44,000VND, and Player 2 will earn 28,000VND. 
• Suppose Player 2 decides to return 48,000VND to Player 1.  Player 1 will earn 
52,000VND, and Player 2 will earn 20,000VND. 
 
In the real game, Player 1 could give only 2,000VND, 4,000VND, 6,000VND, 8,000VND, 
10,000VND, 12,000VND, or 14,000VND, or 16,000VND, or 18,000VND, or 20,000VND, or 
nothing. They cannot choose any other amount. Player 2 can send back any amount of money 
they want or nothing. It does not have to be the same as the ones shown in Tables 1-10. Tables 1-
10 are given just as references for Player 2. 
 
Please complete the following exercises by filling the parentheses (     ).  
You may want to use Tables 1-10 to help you solve them. If you have questions or do not 
understand the game, please let us know. We are very happy to help you.  When you finish all 4 
exercises, please raise your hand.  
 
Exercise 1.  
Imagine Player 1 gives 12,000VND to Player 2.  
We will triple this amount, so Player 2 gets (  ) VND in addition to their initial 
20,000VND.  
At this point, Player 1 has (   ) VND  
             and Player 2 has (   ) VND.  
Suppose Player 2 decides to return 6,000VND to Player 1.  
Player 1 will earn (   ) VND and Player 2 will earn (  ) VND.  
 
Exercise 2.  
Imagine  Player 1 gives 6,000VND to Player 2.  
We will triple this amount, so Player 2 gets (  )VND in addition to their initial 
20,000VND.  
At this point, Player 1 has (   )VND  
             and Player 2 has (   )VND.  
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Suppose Player 2 decides to return 6,000VND to Player 1.  
Player 1 will earn (   )VND  and Player 2 will earn (  )VND.  
 
Exercise 3.  
Imagine  Player 1 gives 18,000VND to Player 2.  
We will triple this amount, so Player 2 gets (  )VND in addition to their initial 
20,000VND.  
At this point, Player 1 has (   )VND  
             and Player 2 has (   )VND.  
Suppose Player 2 decides to return 9,000VND to Player 1.  
Player 1 will earn (   )VND  and Player 2 will earn (  )VND.  
 
Exercise 4.  
Imagine  Player 1 gives 20,000VND to Player 2.  
We will triple this amount, so Player 2 gets (  )VND in addition to their initial 
20,000VND.  
At this point, Player 1 has (   )VND  
             and Player 2 has (   )VND.  
Suppose Player 2 decides to return 39,000VND to Player 1.  
 Player 1 will earn (   )VND  and Player 2 will earn (  )VND.  
 
After you complete above exercises, we will ask you to go out of the room to make 
decisions.  
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Table 1 
Suppose Player 1 sends 2,000VND to Player 2.  
Then, Player 2 will receive 6,000VND.  
  Player 1 earns Player 2 earns Total 
If Player 2 returns nothing, 18,000    26,000        44,000  
If Player 2 returns 1,000VND, 19,000 25,000 44,000 
If Player 2 returns 2,000VND, 20,000 24,000       44,000  
If Player 2 returns 3,000VND, 21,000 23,000 44,000 
If Player 2 returns 4,000VND, 22,000 22,000       44,000  
If Player 2 returns 5,000VND, 23,000 21,000 44,000 
If Player 2 returns 6,000VND, 24,000 20,000       44,000  
 
Table 2 
Suppose Player 1 sends 4,000VND to Player 2.  
Then, Player 2 will receive 12,000VND.  
  Player 1 earns Player 2 earns Total 
If Player 2 returns nothing, 16,000    32,000        48,000  
If Player 2 returns 2,000VND, 18,000 30,000 48,000 
If Player 2 returns 4,000VND, 20,000 28,000       48,000  
If Player 2 returns 6,000VND, 22,000 26,000 48,000 
If Player 2 returns 8,000VND, 24,000 24,000       48,000  
If Player 2 returns 10,000VND, 26,000 22,000 48,000 
If Player 2 returns 12,000VND, 28,000 20,000       48,000  
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Table 3 
Suppose Player 1 sends 6,000VND to Player 2.  
Then, Player 2 will receive 18,000VND.  
  Player 1 earns Player 2 earns Total 
If Player 2 returns nothing, 14,000    38,000        52,000  
If Player 2 returns 3,000VND, 17,000 35,000 52,000 
If Player 2 returns 6,000VND, 20,000 32,000       52,000  
If Player 2 returns 9,000VND, 23,000 29,000 52,000 
If Player 2 returns 12,000VND, 26,000 26,000       52,000  
If Player 2 returns 15,000VND, 29,000 23,000 52,000 
If Player 2 returns 18,000VND, 32,000 20,000       52,000  
 
 
Table 4 
Suppose Player 1 sends 8,000VND to Player 2.  
Then, Player 2 will receive 24,000VND.  
  Player 1 earns Player 2 earns Total 
If Player 2 returns nothing, 12,000    44,000        56,000  
If Player 2 returns 4,000VND, 16,000 40,000 56,000 
If Player 2 returns 8,000VND, 20,000 36,000       56,000  
If Player 2 returns 12,000VND, 24,000 32,000 56,000 
If Player 2 returns 16,000VND, 28,000 28,000       56,000  
If Player 2 returns 20,000VND, 32,000 24,000 56,000 
If Player 2 returns 24,000VND, 36,000 20,000       56,000  
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Table 5 
Suppose Player 1 sends 10,000VND to Player 2.  
Then,  Player 2 will receive 30,000VND.  
  Player 1 earns Player 2 earns Total 
If Player 2 returns nothing, 10,000    50,000        60,000  
If Player 2 returns 5,000VND, 15,000 45,000 60,000 
If Player 2 returns 10,000VND, 20,000 40,000       60,000  
If Player 2 returns 15,000VND, 25,000 35,000 60,000 
If Player 2 returns 20,000VND, 30,000 30,000       60,000  
If Player 2 returns 25,000VND, 35,000 25,000 60,000 
If Player 2 returns 30,000VND, 40,000 20,000       60,000  
 
Table 6 
Suppose Player 1 sends 12,000VND to Player 2.  
Then, Player 2 will receive 36,000VND.  
  Player 1 earns Player 2 earns Total 
If Player 2 returns nothing, 8,000    56,000        64,000  
If Player 2 returns 6,000VND, 14,000 50,000 64,000 
If Player 2 returns 12,000VND, 20,000 44,000       64,000  
If Player 2 returns 18,000VND, 26,000 38,000 64,000 
If Player 2 returns 24,000VND, 32,000 32,000       64,000  
If Player 2 returns 32,000VND, 38,000 26,000 64,000 
If Player 2 returns 36,000VND, 44,000 20,000       64,000  
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Table 7 
Suppose Player 1 sends 14,000VND to Player 2.  
Then, Player 2 will receive 42,000VND.  
  Player 1 earns Player 2 earns Total 
If Player 2 returns nothing, 6,000    62,000        68,000  
If Player 2 returns 7,000VND, 13,000 55,000 68,000 
If Player 2 returns 14,000VND, 20,000 48,000       68,000  
If Player 2 returns 21,000VND, 27,000 41,000       68,000  
If Player 2 returns 28,000VND, 34,000 34,000       68,000  
If Player 2 returns 35,000VND, 41,000 27,000       68,000  
If Player 2 returns 42,000VND, 48,000 20,000       68,000  
 
Table 8 
Suppose Player 1 sends 16,000VND to Player 2. 
Then, Player 2 will receive 48,000VND.  
  Player 1 earns Player 2 earns Total 
If Player 2 returns nothing, 4,000    68,000        72,000  
If Player 2 returns 8,000VND, 12,000 60,000       72,000  
If Player 2 returns 16,000VND, 20,000 52,000       72,000  
If Player 2 returns 24,000VND, 28,000 44,000       72,000  
If Player 2 returns 32,000VND, 36,000 36,000       72,000  
If Player 2 returns 40,000VND, 44,000 28,000       72,000  
If Player 2 returns 48,000VND, 52,000 20,000       72,000  
 
 
  50 
Table 9 
Suppose Player 1 sends 18,000VND to Player 2.  
Then, Player 2 will receive 54,000VND.  
  Player 1 earns Player 2 earns Total 
If Player 2 returns nothing, 2,000    74,000        76,000  
If Player 2 returns 9,000VND, 11,000 65,000       76,000  
If Player 2 returns 18,000VND, 20,000 56,000       76,000  
If Player 2 returns 27,000VND, 29,000 47,000       76,000  
If Player 2 returns 36,000VND, 38,000 38,000       76,000  
If Player 2 returns 45,000VND, 47,000 29,000       76,000  
If Player 2 returns 54,000VND, 56,000 20,000       76,000  
 
Table 10 
Suppose Player 1 sends 20,000VND to Player 2.  
Then, Player 2 will receive 60,000VND.  
  Player 1 earns Player 2 earns Total 
If Player 2 returns nothing, 0    80,000        80,000  
If Player 2 returns 10,000VND, 10,000 70,000       80,000  
If Player 2 returns 20,000VND, 20,000 60,000       80,000  
If Player 2 returns 30,000VND, 30,000 50,000       80,000  
If Player 2 returns 40,000VND, 40,000 40,000       80,000  
If Player 2 returns 50,000VND, 50,000 30,000       80,000  
If Player 2 returns 60,000VND, 60,000 20,000       80,000  
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Instruction to Player 1 
 
You are Player 1. You are given 20,000VND. I would like you to decide how much money you 
want to send to Player 2. You can send Player 2 nothing, 2,000VND, 4,000VND, 6,000VND, 
8,000VND, 10,000VND, 12,000VND, 14,000VND, 16,000VND, 18,000VND, or 20,000VND.  
 
Please write down how much money you want to send to Player 2 if his/her ID is A, B, or C, 
respectively. After we collect the record sheets from all participants, we will randomly match 
you with someone who was assigned a role of Player 2. At this time we don’t know who is 
receiving your money or what their ID is. So, please write down the amounts you want to send to 
Player 2, depending on their ID (A, B or C). Also, please write down how much money you 
think Player 2 will return to you. 
 
After you complete the record sheet, please give it back to me. Please do not go back to the room 
until all participants finish playing the game. We will call you back to the room when we are 
ready for the next game. While you are waiting, please fill in the questionnaire.  
 
Please do not discuss the game with your friends while you are waiting. 
  52 
Record Sheet  - Game 1 (Player 1)- 
 
Please fill in the following parentheses (     ).  
 
 
A.  
I want to send (   ) VND to Player 2 if his/her ID is A. 
The money will be tripled, so Player 2 will get (     )VND in addition to his/her 
initial 20,000VND.  
I think Player 2 will return (  )VND to me.  
 
 
 
B.  
I want to send (   ) VND to Player 2 if his/her ID is B. 
The money will be tripled, so Player 2 will get (     )VND in addition to his/her 
initial 20,000VND.  
I think Player 2 will return (  )VND to me.  
 
 
C.  
I want to send (   ) VND to Player 2 if his/her ID is C. 
The money will be tripled, so Player 2 will get (     )VND in addition to his/her 
initial 20,000VND.  
I think Player 2 will return (  )VND to me.  
 
You can choose either the same amount of money or different amounts of money for each case 
(for each ID). 
 
 
Your decisions will remain confidential. 
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 Instruction to Player 2 
 
 
You are Player 2. You are given 20,000VND. In addition to 20,000VND, you will receive some 
money from Player 1. you must decide how much money you want to send back to Player 1. You 
may want to refer to Tables 1-10 to make your decisions. However, you can send back any 
amount of money you want. It does not have to be the same as the ones in the Tables 1-10. Or 
you may send nothing. 
 
Please write down how much money you want to return to Player 1 depending on the amount 
he/she sends to you.  After we collect the record sheets from all participants, we will randomly 
match you with someone who was assigned a role of Player 1. At this time we don’t know who is 
sending you money, or how much he/she is sending you. So, please write down the amounts you 
want to return to Player 1, contingent on how much he/she sends to you.  
After you complete the record sheet, please give it back to me.  Please do not go back to the 
room until all participants finish playing the game. We will call you back to the room when we 
are ready for the next game. While you are waiting, please fill in the questionnaire.  
 
Please do not discuss the game with your friends while you are waiting. 
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Record Sheet  - Game 1 (Player 2)- 
 
 
 
If Player 1 sends me 2,000 VND, I will return (   )VND. 
 
If Player 1 sends me 4,000 VND, I will return (   )VND. 
 
If Player 1 sends me 6,000 VND, I will return (   )VND. 
 
If Player 1 sends me 8,000 VND, I will return (   )VND. 
 
If Player 1 sends me 10,000 VND, I will return (   )VND. 
 
If Player 1 sends me 12,000 VND, I will return (   )VND. 
 
If Player 1 sends me 14,000 VND, I will return (   )VND. 
 
If Player 1 sends me 16,000 VND, I will return (   )VND. 
 
If Player 1 sends me 18,000 VND, I will return (   )VND. 
 
If Player 1 sends me 20,000 VND, I will return (   )VND. 
 
 
 
 
Your decisions will remain confidential. 
 
